On 17 June 2025, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences held a round table entitled “The Role of BRICS in Political and Economic Cooperation among African Countries”.
The event included a presentation of the RIAC working paper “African Countries in BRICS: New Opportunities for Economic and Political Cooperation”.
Opening remarks at the round table were delivered by Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russia’s BRICS Sherpa and RIAC member; Ivan Timofeev, Director General of RIAC; Irina Abramova, Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences and RIAC member; and Victoria Panova, Head of the BRICS–Russia Expert Council, Co-Chair of the BRICS Civil Council, Russia’s Sherpa in the Women’s Twenty and RIAC member.
During the presentation of the RIAC working paper “African Countries in BRICS: New Opportunities for Economic and Political Cooperation”, the team of authors presented the main provisions and conclusions of the publication.
In her remarks, Head of the Centre for African Strategy in BRICS at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Daria Zelenova outlined the key aspects of African countries’ interest in BRICS, as well as the interest of BRICS member states in the African continent. Above all, Africa is interested in finance and infrastructure investment through the New Development Bank. The case of South Africa is quite successful, as Pretoria currently has 12 projects implemented through the NDB. These are mainly infrastructure projects and initiatives of major socio-economic significance, including those aimed at overcoming the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. South Africa has received a substantial share of NDB loans, most of them denominated in the national currency. Therefore, the financial aspect of participation in BRICS is extremely important for African countries. BRICS can provide new economic opportunities, in particular deeper integration within the African Continental Free Trade Area. This has been repeatedly mentioned in BRICS declarations: the commitment to further developing the African Continental Free Trade Area, access to advanced technologies, alternative payment systems, settlements in national currencies, income redistribution and Africa’s full participation in global supply chains. African countries are also interested in BRICS at the political level, as participation in the association enhances Africa’s agency in global governance institutions. South Africa’s participation in BRICS since 2011 demonstrates a clear trend towards the Africanisation of the BRICS agenda, as Pretoria has consistently promoted African issues year after year. Speaking about why Africa is attractive to BRICS, Daria Zelenova first of all pointed to resources. Demographic capital and consumer markets are important for the economic development of BRICS countries. In addition, the high growth rates of individual African states and the established economic ties between countries of the continent and BRICS members, particularly India and China, make Africa attractive for the association. Daria Zelenova also highlighted political factors that make Africa attractive to BRICS, including the political capital of anti-colonial struggle, the historical legacy of Pan-Africanism, and the commonality of values and approaches within the association. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 and recent BRICS declarations overlap in a number of areas.
Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for African Strategy in BRICS of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Sofia Zamesina presented an analysis of Ethiopia’s foreign policy strategy, noting that the country’s accession to BRICS was a “quite natural” decision. She traced the evolution of Ethiopia’s foreign policy from the imperial tradition, which relied on a stable narrative connected with the fact that the country had never been colonised, to the current stage of multi-vector foreign policy, which began after Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. In 2022, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a draft of a new doctrine, marking a focus on development, the use of soft power, diversification of foreign policy and a rejection of the use of coercive instruments. During her presentation, Sofia Zamesina presented a map of Ethiopia’s external partnerships. Today, Ethiopia largely adheres to neutrality and a multi-vector approach in its foreign policy. The country does not promote major initiatives within BRICS, but it is implementing macroeconomic reforms that may create a basis for more active engagement in the future.
Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for African Strategy in BRICS of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and research intern at the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies of the Higher School of Economics Andrey Ufimtsev drew the audience’s attention to the motives behind Egypt’s accession to BRICS. He noted that Egypt had sought to participate in BRICS long before formally joining the association. As early as 2013 and 2017, Egyptian presidents took part in BRICS summits. In 2021, Cairo was invited to join the New Development Bank, and in 2023 the Egyptian parliament ratified the country’s participation in it. Since 2024, Cairo has been a member of BRICS. Among researchers studying Egypt, there is a view that Egyptian foreign policy is aimed at seeking political rent, given the country’s relatively high budget deficit and balance-of-payments deficit. For a long time, Egypt attempted to solve these problems through external partners, traditionally Western countries. When Egypt joined BRICS, many members of the Egyptian elite associated accession with financial benefits. There is a significant range of economic problems to which the Egyptian elite seeks to offer solutions. The decision to join BRICS is presented to the public as a certain intensification of efforts to address these problems. Another goal of Cairo’s accession to BRICS is the opportunity to expand cooperation with countries of the Global South and to demonstrate a multi-vector foreign policy. Egypt also gains greater international prestige and influence.
Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for African Strategy in BRICS of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Ekaterina Abramova addressed the topic of African partner countries. She noted that the status of partner state is regarded as a flexible format of integration and provides access to a wide range of working groups and platforms. In her remarks, the researcher emphasised that the integration momentum of Uganda and Nigeria is fairly similar in nature, since both countries are predisposed to regional leadership. In BRICS, these states see not only a platform for strengthening their political weight, but also an opportunity to give practical substance to this status, with the political dimension supported by an economic foundation. Ekaterina Abramova also discussed Algeria’s path: after applying for membership, the country eventually joined the New Development Bank, but has not yet become a member of BRICS. It was noted that even after joining the NDB, Algeria’s political ambitions remain largely unsatisfied, as becomes clear from dialogue with Algerian experts.
At the conclusion of the working paper presentation, Daria Zelenova presented an analysis of the role of the African Union in the BRICS context, highlighting the value-based and structural levels of convergence between the two associations. She stressed that, unlike in the G20, Africa is not a minority within BRICS but an equal partner, which creates a fundamentally different climate for negotiations.
After the presentation of the working paper, the round table participants proceeded to an expert discussion of both the publication and the broader topic of the event. The discussion featured remarks by Andrey Maslov, Director of the Centre for African Studies at the Higher School of Economics; Oleg Barabanov, Professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor at the Department of Integration Processes at MGIMO University of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; and Ivan Loshkarev, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Theory at MGIMO University of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
