In an interview with the TASS Analytical Center, Daria Zelenova, Head of the Centre for African Strategy in BRICS at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and PhD in Political Science, commented on the undiplomatic language used by the U.S. Ambassador in Pretoria, the complicated domestic political situation in the country, as well as the state visit of the President of South Africa to Brazil.
According to media reports, Washington sent South Africa’s leadership a set of official demands through its ambassador in Pretoria, including withdrawal from BRICS, a shift to non-aligned status, and the withdrawal of South Africa’s case against Israel from the International Court of Justice. This amounts to a direct threat against a sovereign country, does it not? How should this be interpreted?
— Based on the speech I saw in the original sources, which was delivered at a business forum, the ambassador did not directly mention either BRICS or Israel. At the same time, he did indeed use rather harsh language, saying that the United States was “losing patience” over certain issues it views as stumbling blocks to the development of relations with South Africa.
As for the five demands, various issues have indeed been raised at different times that the Trump administration sees as triggers in relations with South Africa. Bozell referred to them again. There are five in total: revising the Expropriation Act, including its provisions on land; reconsidering the so-called Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment programme, or BBEE; declaring the slogan-song “Kill the Boer!” unlawful; and also complying with the demand to “be non-aligned,” which can be translated as adopting a position of non-alignment.
As for the last point, it is not difficult to see that this reflects fundamentally different worldviews. In foreign policy, South Africa presents itself as a state guided by “strategic independence” or “non-alignment.” This is a foundational principle of its foreign policy, rooted in the ideas of the 1955 Bandung Conference, when newly independent Asian states, together with a small number of formally independent African countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, as well as national liberation movements, importantly enough, decided to participate independently and outside bloc structures in shaping the parameters of their future development. What the current U.S. administration understands by “non-alignment” is its own distorted interpretation, one devoid of historical analysis and of an understanding of the growing role of the Global South in world affairs.
The United States wants to return to bloc confrontation and is trying to draw countries such as South Africa into this game, including through direct political pressure and manipulation.
In other words, Trump sees South Africa’s independent foreign policy course as a problem. Among the so-called U.S. demands toward South Africa, Pretoria’s position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has also been discussed, including the demand that Pretoria withdraw its case against Israel from the International Court of Justice.
Moreover, Trump has at times also said that South Africa’s participation in BRICS is itself a problem. At the business forum, Bozell put it this way: the United States is concerned about “South Africa’s growing engagement with some of America’s adversaries.” It is obvious that he meant primarily Iran and China, and that, in his view, such ties undermine “strategic trust” and complicate the maintenance of relations between the United States and South Africa. This is a distorted view of the objective process of the rising role of the non-West in international relations and reflects the Trump administration’s inability to perceive reality as it is. They create problems based on an ideological approach or simply out of bias.
What is especially revealing in Bozell’s speech is that he links Pretoria’s foreign policy choices not only to diplomacy, but also to the business climate: in his logic, geopolitical rapprochement with “regimes that do not share democratic principles” reduces investor confidence and worsens the prospects for bilateral cooperation. Yet there is also a very concrete interest behind this rhetoric. For example, by pressuring South Africans to make concessions on the BBEE law, Washington wants to make it easier for its own companies, including Starlink, to enter the market, even though they are required to operate within the framework of domestic legislation. South African law requires that any company operating in the country be 30% owned by Black South Africans, who are classified as a historically disadvantaged group.
It is noteworthy that the ambassador’s speech was not openly confrontational: he did not say that cooperation between Washington and South Africa was impossible. On the contrary, he repeatedly stressed that the United States wants to expand economic partnership, investment, trade, digital cooperation, and collaboration on critical minerals. A positive trend for both economies remains the fact that, despite Trump’s introduction of 30% tariffs, trade between South Africa and the United States has grown slightly, although the structure of bilateral trade has changed substantially. In 2025, bilateral trade amounted to approximately $22.8 billion.
Bozell noted that in order to deepen relations between South Africa and the United States, there needs to be “alignment on fundamentals,” that is, a more acceptable strategic and political positioning of South Africa, acceptable, of course, only from the U.S. perspective. And this is precisely where the main problem of an unequal partnership arises.
The United States sees itself as a hegemon entitled to impose its own rules of the game. South Africa, by contrast, adhering to the principles of multilateralism and non-alignment, continues its strategic engagement with both Western and non-Western partners.
These are fundamental principles that Pretoria has upheld since the transition to non-racial democracy in 1994. The new U.S. administration is trying to alter this course because it pursues its own economic interests and does not want to accept the emergence of a new multipolar world in which the Global South is equally represented.
What kind of figure is Bozell? What are his roots?
— Bozell is, of course, a rather specific figure, with far-right views. He is an Irish Catholic who grew up in a religious family, and his political formation took place during the Reagan era. In the 1980s, when many in Europe and the United States had already come to understand that the African National Congress (ANC) was an organization one could and should engage with, Bozell took part in a committee that called for the ANC to be treated as a terrorist organization. I have the impression that he has remained trapped in the political reality of the 1980s, with his ultraconservative views, which raise questions even within the white South African business community.
For him, the history of South Africa’s liberation through the mass struggle led by the ANC remains something deeply hostile. And he has only a weak understanding of what contemporary South African identity is built upon.
Is this in any way connected to the domestic political situation in South Africa? Is there an attempt to destabilize the country? After all, not everything there is ideal.
— Without a doubt, South Africa’s domestic political field is very complicated. For example, after publicly expressing disrespect for South Africa’s judicial system, Bozell was forced to apologize. The country’s Constitutional Court had ruled that the song “Kill the Boer!” was not racist because it is used in a specific historical context. This remains a controversial ruling for many within South Africa, but once the court has ruled, people generally do not reopen the issue. After Bozell publicly stated that he “did not care what the South African court thought,” he was summoned to South Africa’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He subsequently published an official clarification on Twitter, where he was forced to state that he respected the courts of the country to which he had been appointed as ambassador.
On the one hand, this may suggest Bozell’s diplomatic incompetence; on the other, it is possible that behind this lies a carefully calibrated pressure tactic: first, publicly announce certain demands before the business community, then publicly apologize, while still keeping the door open for negotiations.
As for the domestic political situation in South Africa, one can, for example, pay attention to the position of the small but politically “loud” Patriotic Alliance (PA), which, first, is made up predominantly of so-called Coloureds, a historically marginalized population largely descended from mixed marriages, though not between “Black” and “white” groups; second, is led by the current Minister of Sports, Arts and Culture, Gayton McKenzie; and third, is part of South Africa’s current coalition government, the Government of National Unity, formed after the 2024 general elections.
The party won only 2% of the vote in the last parliamentary elections, but the public profile of the Minister of Culture makes it quite visible in the media space. For example, after the scandal surrounding Bozell’s statements, the PA publicly expressed solidarity with the ambassador on a number of issues and, in what appeared to be a demonstrative move, held a meeting with him, once again reminding the public of its support for the United States and Israel in their confrontation with Iran.
Thus, different political forces coexist within South Africa’s political space, making it complex but also, to some degree, balancing out opposing factions.
И, конечно, надо смотреть в будущее. В 2029 году в ЮАР пройдут всеобщие выборы (а до этого, вероятно, в конце года должны пройти муниципальные выборы), к которым АНК подходит объективно с не очень прочным политическим капиталом. Во-первых, внутренние проблемы в стране, безработица, неравенство, а также коррупция в госаппарате постоянно дополняются обвинениями в том, что АНК плохо управляет страной. И здесь, возможно, президенту Рамапосе могут поставить в вину то, что он слишком мягко действует, пытается выглядеть слишком хорошим переговорщиком, стремится примирить всех в свете ультиматумов, которые ему выдвигают, в том числе, теперь уже и новый посол США.
He is still criticized for the episode when he took golfers, representatives of the largest Afrikaner white business interests in South Africa, to the White House for talks with Trump. Many people in the country, including within his own ANC party, condemned this as an act of weakness.
Many want to see a leader at the helm who, in the best sense of the phrase, is tough and strong and ready to defend national interests.
This is because the ultimatums put forward by Trump and his associates largely correlate with the agenda promoted by the Democratic Alliance (DA). This is the country’s largest opposition party; in the past it supported apartheid, and today it remains predominantly white. It is also part of the coalition government. Traditionally, its foreign policy agenda has been pro-Western, oriented primarily toward cooperation with the EU, Britain, and the United States. It took an openly unfriendly position toward Russia after 2022 and also voiced the view that South Africa should leave BRICS. But things are not entirely straightforward even within its ranks: different tendencies coexist inside the party, and far from everyone believes that South Africa should abandon its traditional line of multilateralism.
President Cyril Ramaphosa recently paid a state visit to Brazil, where he held talks with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. One BRICS leader visiting another, and both countries were among the founders of the grouping.
— It seems to me that this reflects a positive scenario of how traditional South-South strategic partnership is being built. Brazil and South Africa are two countries that participate in various multilateral formats: BRICS, IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), and the G20. In all of these, both countries are focused on advancing the interests of the Global South within the institutions of global governance.
Judging by what is set out in the extensive communiqué issued after the meeting and talks between the two presidents, one can see a large number of points of convergence and synergy in their vision of the future world order: both countries’ commitment to multilateralism and the absence of bloc thinking. Both Brazil and South Africa, as BRICS members, proceed from the understanding that the United Nations should stand at the center of this multilateralism as the key organization responsible for ensuring proper global governance.
At the same time, the need for reform of the UN Security Council is emphasized, including the inclusion of both South Africa and Brazil as permanent members. Both countries see one another as leaders of their respective continents.
Attention should also be paid to the entire section devoted to security issues, where a common position is outlined on a number of conflicts: from the creation of two states as the only possible outcome of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to condemnation of U.S. and Israeli aggression against Iran, support for Venezuela, and concern over the conflicts in the DRC, the Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. It is noteworthy that during this visit, a defense cooperation agreement was signed, providing for joint research, development, logistical support, and more.
What is particularly important and valuable for demographically young societies is that South Africans and Brazilians are jointly defending the idea of women’s empowerment, both in business and in public administration. For countries of the Global South, the active role of women in shaping a just world order, as well as women’s participation in business and state-building, is an extremely important issue, one that can only be welcomed.
One can also note that President Ramaphosa gave particular attention to the preferential trade agreement between the Southern African Customs Union (SACU, comprising South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Eswatini) and MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, with Venezuela’s membership currently suspended), which both sides intend to expand by deepening the current level of integration. At the same time, trade between the two countries remains relatively low, amounting to $1.7 billion in 2025.
Naturally, BRICS was also mentioned separately, because both Brazil and South Africa share an understanding that BRICS is a unique platform for expanding South-South cooperation.
The presidents of the two countries called for the swift completion of a new iteration of the so-called BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy, which was first adopted in 2015 on the condition that it would be updated every five years.
Thus, both leaders emphasized their constructive approach and their commitment to ensuring that BRICS continues to develop as a powerful economic forum and as an instrument of the new international architecture of the countries of the Global South.
